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Bringing the Background to the Fore in Sexual History 
Evidence 
 
Findlay Stark* 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Evans1 has renewed interest in reforming section 41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. This provision allows leave to be given for 
the defence to adduce evidence of, or cross-examine any witness about, ‘any sexual behaviour 
or other sexual experience, whether or not involving any accused or other person’ 
(hereinafter, ‘sexual history evidence’) relating to the complainant in a sexual offences case.2 
One proposal for reform, introduced by Harriet Harman MP into the Prison and Courts Bill 
before the dissolution of Parliament, would have removed the possibility of leave: section 41 
would have become an absolute bar on the admissibility of evidence of the complainant’s 
sexual history.3 This proposal, which may conceivably reappear during the next Parliament, 
was presumably intended to legislate in violation of the right to a fair trial. There is no need to 
go that far, but there is fresh cause for reflection: Evans indicates (once again) that section 
41’s wording and structure obscures more than it clarifies. The legislation also does not quite 
mean what it says, because of the House of Lords’ decision in A (No 2).4 Reform would be 
useful, and a suggested starting point would be to refocus attention on the oft-neglected 
section 41(2)(b) of the Act, which has the potential to strike an appropriate balance between 
the competing interests at stake in this area. 
 
Evans: facts 
Although the facts of Evans are well known, their key importance to analysing the Court’s 
decision, and establishing if there is a need for reform, requires them to be laid out fully.  
The allegation was that E and M had raped X who, due to her intoxication, lacked the 
capacity to consent.5 Crucially, X could not remember what had happened. 
E’s evidence was that he had entered the hotel room in which M and X were having 
consensual sex. M gave evidence that he invited E to join in, with X’s consent. E engaged in 
sexual intercourse with X, her adopting the ‘doggie’ position and saying ‘fuck me harder’. 
M was acquitted, and E convicted. E’s second appeal against conviction6 arose from a 
reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission that concerned evidence from O and 
H.7 O had gone home with X on three previous occasions, but no sexual intercourse had taken 
place. X could not, however, remember that the morning after. This surprised O, who did not 
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2 Behaviour that is part of the alleged offence is excluded: YJCEA 1999, s. 42(1)(c). The list of sexual offences 
in s. 62.  
3 https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0145/amend/prisons_rm_pbc_0323.1-2.html.  
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think that X had been that drunk. On the fourth occasion O and X had met, they had had sex. 
This was approximately two weeks after the alleged rape. X adopted the ‘doggie’ position and 
said something like ‘fuck me harder’.  
H’s evidence was that he had communicated with X via social media and text 
messages, before meeting her and going back to H’s home. No sexual intercourse took place. 
The next day, X returned to H’s home and they had sexual intercourse. The two had had sex 
on a casual basis five or six times thereafter, often after X had been drinking. H corroborated 
O’s account of X instigating sexual activity whilst heavily intoxicated, including in the 
‘doggie’ position whilst saying ‘go harder’. 
 The primary question for the Court was whether this evidence could properly have 
been admitted under section 41.8 
 
Relevance 
The starting point is logical relevance: does a specific piece of sexual history evidence 
increase or decrease the probability of the existence of a disputed fact in proceedings? Two 
points should be made before proceeding. First, logical relevance does not exist in a vacuum – 
it depends on other evidence in a case, and how a case is argued – and this makes general 
claims about relevance and irrelevance (although common in this area) of dubious value.9 
Secondly, ‘the word “relevant”, particularly in this context, is socially constructed, with a 
nebulous and shifting definition, rather than being an objective, analytically derived creation 
of pure logic’.10 The best that can be said, then, is that decisions about relevance and sexual 
history evidence are genuinely very difficult, even within the factual framework of a concrete 
case. 11  
With these caveats in mind, the correct question is at least in view: does O and H’s 
evidence have probative value regarding an issue contested between the prosecution and the 
defence in Evans? 
 
Relevance and reasonable beliefs in consent 
Could O and H’s evidence raise a reasonable doubt over the proposition that E lacked a 
reasonable belief in X’s consent? The CCRC referred E’s case based on this ground, and it 
was one basis upon which the Court concluded that admissibility of O and H’s evidence could 
have been founded.12 
At first, this argument appears odd: E did not know of X’s behaviour with O and H at 
the time of the alleged rape.13 Even if E had known of X’s behaviour with O and H, it can 
legitimately be questioned whether this helps decide whether E’s belief was a reasonable one 
to hold.14 
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An answer (though one not given expressly in such terms by the Court) is that E was 
arguing that he reasonably believed that, although intoxicated, X still had the capacity to 
consent, and the credibility of this account is heavily reliant on how visibly drunk X was at 
the time. The evidence of O (at least) suggests that, even whilst intoxicated to the extent that 
she claimed to have memory loss the next morning, X would not appear to be too drunk to 
possess the capacity to consent. That others have miscalculated a person’s state of 
intoxication makes it more likely that the defendant miscalculated that person’s state of 
intoxication at the time of the alleged offence, which makes it more likely that E 
(reasonably?) believed X was capable of consenting, which might secure reasonable doubt.  
 
Relevance and consent 
Moving beyond beliefs about consent, consideration can be given to whether consent itself 
existed. Evans is perhaps ‘unusual’,15 as it is not a case where the complainant gave evidence 
of non-consent, which was countered by the defendant’s evidence. X’s evidence was that she 
could not remember what happened. This is not the same as saying there was no consent. In 
Bree,16 it was held that the relevant question is not whether the complainant has a ‘very poor 
recollection of precisely what happened’,17 but instead whether the capacity to make the 
choice to engage in the relevant sexual activity existed.18 It was confirmed that the capacity to 
consent ‘may evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious’.19 In short: being 
conscious at the time of sexual activity can be consistent with having not consented; having 
memory loss can be consistent with having consented. 
The prosecution case was that X was incapable of doing what E and M claimed she 
had done.20 Evidence that, whilst in a similar state of intoxication, X had managed to do what 
E and M alleged she did (and later claimed memory loss, at least with O) gives their defence 
more credibility.21 This suggests that evidence of sexual activity with third parties can 
sometimes (but not often)22 be relevant to the question of whether the complainant consented 
to sexual activity with the defendant. Importantly, O and H’s evidence was relevant not 
because it showed she had simply engaged in sex with other men (and was thus more likely to 
consent with E), or simply to suggest X is simply less capable of belief because of her sexual 
history.23 Those who are (rightly or wrongly) universally against those arguments for the 
logical relevance of sexual history evidence can (not must) thus accept that logical relevance 
was present in Evans.24 
 
Admissibility 
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The generalisations relied upon to establish logical relevance in the previous section are at 
least controversial, and there are difficulties in O and H giving evidence about how X acted in 
distinct scenarios without having seen X on the night in question. Added to this, there is good 
reason to think that admitting sexual history evidence is highly prejudicial to the interests of 
complainants.25 Consideration must thus be given to whether logically relevant sexual history 
evidence should nevertheless be inadmissible. 
One might object that excluding any logically relevant evidence on the part of the 
defendant is unjustified: the defendant has ‘more to lose’, and so should not be so constrained 
by concerns of prejudice to witnesses for the prosecution. This view has quite clearly been 
rejected by the legislature in passing section 41, is not the effect of A (No 2), and pays 
insufficient regard to the competing interests at stake in this context. It will be assumed here 
that the legislature is right to attempt to strike a balance between the interests of defendants 
and complainants in relation to sexual history evidence. 
This balance is struck in section 41 through applying specific grounds for 
admissibility (following the recent trend, these will be called ‘gateways’ to admissibility) 
subject to an overriding test. The analysis here will proceed along these lines. 
 
The ‘gateways’ to admissibility 
It is necessary to once again distinguish between the issues of consent and reasonable belief in 
consent.  
First, section 41(3)(a) allows the admissibility of sexual history evidence that relates 
to an issue other than consent. Section 42(1)(b) states that the issue of the defendant’s beliefs 
about consent is not an issue of consent.26 Thus, a ‘gateway’ is got through in Evans, at least 
in relation to O’s evidence.27 
 The second issue, consent, is more complicated, and brings up section 41(3)(c). This 
allows trial judges to grant leave to adduce evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour 
where it relates to ‘an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which 
the evidence or question relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar (i) to any 
sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence adduced or to be adduced 
by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part of the event which is the subject matter of 
the charge against the accused, or (ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which 
(according to such evidence) took place at or about the same time as that event, that the 
similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence.’ 
Much is unclear about section 41(3)(c), but it has affinities with the now-legislatively-
superseded ‘similar facts’ evidence doctrine.28 The language of coincidence, for example, 
harks back to DPP v Boardman, which required that ‘the crime charged is committed in a 
uniquely or strikingly similar manner to other crimes committed by the accused … The 
similarity would have to be so unique or striking that common sense makes it inexplicable on 
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28 A (No 2), at [85]. 
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the basis of coincidence’.29 The courts have, however, not found section 41(3)(c) to set the bar 
this high, as ‘striking similarity’ is not required.30 There is, however, apparently a need for 
more than a probative value exceeding the evidence’s possible prejudicial impact31 (another 
test for the admissibility of ‘similar fact’ evidence).32 For instance, the bare existence of a 
sexual relationship between the parties will not be enough.33 It is clear enough from A (No 2) 
that it will be a very rare case where third party sexual history evidence (such as that in 
Evans) is admissible through section 41(3)(c).34  
Beyond that, not much is clear, particularly what the mention of ‘coincidence’ means, 
substantively. In most cases, coincidence or the absence of coincidence is asserted without 
explanation.35 The plainest statement in A (No 2) explained that: ‘the similarity [did not have] 
to be in some rare or bizarre conduct. … the language seems … to be looking for some 
characteristic or incident of the complainant’s sexual behaviour which can reasonably be seen 
to have a significance beyond the fact that it is contemporaneous with the behaviour and 
which bears some kind of connection or relationship with the behaviour which on a 
reasonable view is not a mere matter of chance.’36 Perhaps the best that can be made of this 
statement, following Evans, is that – if the sexual history evidence is to get through section 
41(3)(c) – the alleged similarity must credibly arise from there being consent in each 
circumstance, rather than a different causal factor. That the complainant was in each reported 
incident of sexual activity wearing a tiara, although unusual, would fail this test: tiaras having 
nothing (normally) to do with consent to sex, it does not stretch incredulity to say that it is 
likely that the complainant’s wearing of a tiara was simply a matter of chance, and 
coincidental, relative to the question of whether the complainant was consenting. It was much 
more likely just a fashion choice. It will only be very unusual cases (where a tiara-based fetish 
exists, for example) that the tiara will not seem coincidental relative to the question of 
consent. The more ‘usual’ similar activities in Evans, by contrast, have a clearer common 
sense connection with consensual sexual activity. People direct and encourage sexual partners 
usually because they are consenting; that is the most obvious causal explanation for the 
similarity in conduct. Although it is conceivable that a person might direct and encourage a 
sexual partner out of terror of what that partner would otherwise do, that is rare compared to 
cases where direction/encouragement are given by a consenting partner. If that were the 
complainant’s evidence, the trial judge would need to consider whether that evidence credibly 
changes the apparent causal basis for the relevant similarity. 
If this is right, then section 41(3)(c) is after all a relatively weak constraint on 
admissibility.37 The often baffling examples of section 41(3)(c) in action typically do involve 
unusual behaviour, which hides this point: re-enacting the balcony scene from Romeo and 
																																								 																				
29 [1975] A.C. 421, 462. See P. Rook and R. Ward, Rook and Ward on Sexual Offences: Law and Practice, 5th 
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30 See A (No 2), at [158]-[159]. 
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32 DPP v P [1991] 2 A.C. 447. 
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Juliet;38 blackmailing a sexual partner with threats of a false report of rape;39  using an 
unusual word (that would not be said in non-consensual situations) to refer to private parts;40 
having sex in a climbing frame and other ‘unusual’ locations41 (apparently an ‘easy’ case).42 
The veil of unusualness is apparently lifted by Evans: section 41(3)(c) cannot keep out 
similar, ‘usual’ sexual behaviour where that similarity is plausibly non-coincidental relative to 
the question of whether the complainant was consenting on each occasion. This is 
problematic, insofar as there is good reason, on the grounds of policy mentioned earlier, to 
require alleged similarities in conduct to be significant, rather than just causally related, 
before sexual history evidence is admitted. 
 
The unappreciated significance of section 41(2)(b) 
Even if the conclusion regarding section 41(3)(c) in the previous subsection were to be 
accepted, getting through a ‘gateway’ is not a guarantee of admissibility. Section 41(2)(b) – a 
provision that is rarely discussed in any depth – provides that evidence of sexual behaviour 
may be admitted only where ‘a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a 
conclusion of the jury or (as the case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the case’. 
Section 41(2)(b) seems akin (but not identical) to the old rule of admissibility regarding 
‘background’ evidence:43 i.e. evidence necessary to ensure that a rational, complete or 
comprehensible understanding of the other evidence in the case can be undertaken by the 
finder of fact.44 Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003’s successor concept of ‘important 
explanatory evidence’, what is required is that, without the (bad character) evidence ‘the court 
or jury would find it impossible or difficult properly to understand other evidence in the case, 
and [the evidence’s] value for understanding the case as a whole is substantial’.45 
Section 41(2)(b)’s language is less demanding than the idea of background or 
important explanatory evidence (‘might… unsafe’), and it would be foolish to assume that it 
is not susceptible to varying interpretations/applications.46 It is submitted, however, that its 
proper function is to avoid ‘disembodying the case before the jury’47 by keeping them in the 
dark about evidence that genuinely might show other evidence in the case in a significantly 
different light. In A (No 2), the defendant’s story that the complainant and he had consensual 
sex on the way to visit the complainant’s boyfriend in hospital is seen in a meaningfully 
distinct light if there is cogent evidence that the defendant and the complainant had been 
engaged in a clandestine sexual relationship for some weeks before the alleged rape.48 In T 
(Abdul),49 the defendant’s claim that consensual sex took place in a child’s climbing frame in 
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Evidence: Proposals for Fairer Trials’ [2002] Crim. L.R. 531. 
44 Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 220. 
45 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 102. 
46 Cf. J. Temkin, ‘Sexual History Evidence – Beware the backlash’ [2003] Crim. L.R. 217, 238. 
47 A (No 2), at [32]. 
48 J. McEwan, ‘The Rape Shield Askew?’ (2001) 5 E&P 257, 262. The complainant in A denied the relationship 
existed, which is reason for caution. 
49 [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 32. 
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a public park is similarly seen in a new light when cogent evidence is presented that the 
defendant and the complainant had previously engaged in sexual activity in public (including 
in that climbing frame). What unifies these cases is not similarity (as section 41(3)(c) 
requires), or temporal connection (as section 41(3)(b) requires), or more generalised 
arguments about the relevance of sexual history. Rather, it is the idea that the defendant’s 
story, absent the relevant sexual history evidence being admitted, would sound so unusual as 
to be incredible, and thus there is a significant risk that, without that relevant sexual history 
evidence, the defendant has no real defence at all.50 
In the light of this, there is something in the prosecution’s argument in Evans that 
there was nothing particularly unusual about what E was claiming, or what X had apparently 
done on other occasions, to render O and H’s evidence particularly important in establishing 
whether there was consent and/or a reasonable belief in consent. This argument was simply 
misdirected at section 41(3)(c), instead of section 41(2)(b). 
Perhaps there is a worry that juries will not countenance the possibility that someone 
could reasonably believe someone in X’s state of intoxication to have been consenting, and 
that hearing that others have mistaken X’s state of intoxication helps avoid an unfair result. It 
is not clear why the jury’s assessment of E’s evidence on belief and consent is changed 
markedly, however, particularly when O and H did not see X on the evening in question, and 
O and H would obviously have significant reason to say that X was sober enough to consent. 
Maybe another fear is that juries might assume that a person who has memory loss 
after a night’s drinking simply cannot have done what E and M alleged X did, and their 
defence is incredible until we learn that X has on other occasions seemingly consented whilst 
drunk enough to apparently suffer memory loss. It is submitted, however, that it is more likely 
that the jury does not require assistance to establish that, sometimes, very drunk people can 
consent to sex (in line with the guidance in Bree), and to assess the credibility of E and M’s 
evidence in that light. It is noteworthy that the original jury received expert evidence for the 
defence to the effect that X’s assertion of memory loss was surprising given what she 
(thought she) had drunk,51 so E and M’s case was already readily graspable without O and 
H’s evidence. 
It is difficult to tell what the Court thought about section 41(2)(b), and thus impossible 
to say that the decision in Evans was wrong. Section 41(2)(b) was merely cited, and the 
predominant focus was section 41(3)(c) and similarity. Evans suggests that section 41’s 
drafting means similarity (or temporal closeness, in other cases) risks becoming the mark of 
admissibility and sole focus of attention, when it is simply a potential indicator of 
admissibility to be considered in the round. That result could have been avoided had a list of 
criteria for applying section 41(2)(b) (including similarity and temporal closeness, and other 
markers of logical relevance) been preferred over the drafting technique employed in 1999.52 
Before a proposal for reform is made, however, it is necessary to engage with another aspect 
of the debate over sexual history evidence. 
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A (No 2) 
Until now, attention has focussed on the wording in section 41, but the statutory text became 
less important after A (No 2), when it was concluded that it must be read compatibly with 
Article 6, which sometimes means ‘reading down’ (or ignoring!) the legislative language 
under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 Evans is far from clear if the licence granted by A (No 2) was utilised. At one point in 
the judgment, A (No 2)’s ‘ECHR gloss’ was deemed unnecessary because the parties accepted 
that ordinary canons of statutory interpretation could cover the case.53 Ultimately, however, 
the Court concluded that: ‘The requirements of section 41 must give way, as was held in R v 
A (No 2), to the requirements of a fair trial. Relevant and admissible evidence cannot be 
excluded. For those reasons we have concluded that this appeal must be allowed.’54  
 Suppose that the Court in Evans relied on A (No 2). Lord Steyn’s formulation of the 
ultimate decision was adopted by four of the five Lords: ‘the test of admissibility is whether 
the evidence (and questioning in relation to it) is nevertheless so relevant to the issue of 
consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial under article 6’.55 This was a 
comment about section 41(3)(c), but the Lords were bound (to an extent) by section 41’s 
structure. Lord Steyn’s formulation, expanded beyond consent to include beliefs about 
consent, is consistent with reading section 41(2)(b) as a general test of admissibility for 
logically relevant sexual history evidence. The question would then become: without 
admitting the logically relevant sexual history evidence, is the defendant left with a case the 
jury might (unsafely) think incredible? Section 41(2)(b)’s vitally important question would be 
thrust from the background to the fore, and the considerations in the ‘gateways’ would, 
instead of core, confusing foci would become more flexible indicators of logical relevance 
and probative value, that are certainly germane to the question posed in section 41(2)(b). It is 
submitted that this refocusing, rather than the removal of the opportunity to give leave to 
admit sexual history evidence, is the appropriate way forwards. Indeed, strictly no revision of 
the statute itself is required to achieve this result, if A (No 2) is read to allow it, although 
section 41 would be much clearer if it was redrafted along the following lines (changes in 
italics): 
 
41. Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history 
(1) If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the leave of the court 
(a) no evidence may be adduced, and 
(b) no question may be asked in cross-examination, 
by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any sexual behaviour of the complainant. 
(2) The court may give leave in relation to any evidence or question only on an application made by or 
on behalf of an accused, and may only give such leave if it is satisfied [omit subsection (2)(a)] that a 
refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may 
be) the court on any relevant issue in the case. 
(3): In deciding whether the refusal of leave might result in an unsafe conclusion, the court must have 
regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant):  
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(a) the time between the relevant sexual behaviour and the activities that form the basis of the offence 
being tried; and 
(b) any significant similarities between the relevant sexual behaviour and the activities that form the 
basis of the offence being tried. 
[Section 41 would continue as at present, and amendments to section 42 could be made accordingly.] 
 
Unless evidence collected by the Government’s review of section 41, promised in the 
wake of Evans, suggests that such legislative reform would be utterly ineffective, it is 
submitted that it, rather than the Harman amendment, represents the most sensible way 
forwards. This reform is not, however, presented as a panacea. It is the case that more 
research is needed into how to improve reasoning with sexual history evidence, particularly 
once it is admitted, and reduce the potential for biases to cause undue harm to the interests of 
complainants in cases involving sexual offending. 
 
 
